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The Emerging Zika Pandemic
Enhancing Preparedness
most fail to meet international standards. To ensure national preparedness for Zika, countries—including the
United States—should fund and adopt these strategies,
particularly countries already affected and those with significant Aedes mosquito populations.
Vector Control. Mosquito-borne diseases require reducing source populations, including physical (eg, removing water-containing sources) and biological (eg, fish
that feed on larvae) controls. Insecticide spraying of mosquito habitats or adult populations can be effective. Although it remains controversial due to ecological concerns, releasing genetically modified sterile male
mosquitoes could reduce disease-transmitting mosquito larvae. All these strategies require effective mosquito surveillance to ensure focused interventions.
Risk Communication. Health information campaigns should advise the public to avoid mosquito exposure, such as by wearing appropriate clothing, using insect repellents, and spraying insecticide in indoor spaces.
Mild Disease but Growing Concerns
Staying inside protected dwellings during peak mosAbout Microcephaly
quito biting hours can also reduce risk. Using physical barZika virus infection usually is asymptomatic or causes riers such as screens, closed windows, and bed nets can
mild illness, such as fever, rash, muscle/joint pain, and reduce mosquito populations around residential areas.
conjunctivitis; severe disease and fatalities are uncomEnhanced Zika Surveillance. The Pan American
mon. Health authorities, however, are investigating se- Health Organization (PAHO) issued a series of epidevere clinical manifestations, including neurological and miological updates and alerts in 2015 urging enhanced
autoimmune-like illness, particularly Guillain-Barré surveillance for Zika virus, as well as neurological, autoimmune, and congenital malformation
associations.4 The IHR requires counSince Brazil reported Zika virus in May
tries to report unusual Zika-related cases.
PAHO’s guidance prompted El Salvador
2015, infections have occurred in at
to find and report an increase in GBS beleast 20 countries in the Americas.
tween December 2014 and January
2015. Training health workers to obsyndrome (GBS) and congenital neurological malforma- serve and report Zika-related disease and robust systions. Most concerning is a possible association be- tems for collecting and analyzing surveillance data will
tween Zika virus and microcephaly in Brazil and, retro- complement public health strategies.
spectively, in French Polynesia.
Travel Advisories. To minimize harm to high-risk
Brazil has reported nearly 4000 cases of sus- travelers, agencies should consider issuing travel advipected microcephaly in 2015, representing a 20-fold in- sories. Given rapidly evolving epidemiological and
crease from 2010 through 2014.1 Evidence of the virus virological data, the Centers for Disease Control
has been found in the placenta and amniotic fluid of and Prevention (CDC) issued a “level 2” Alert on
mothers and in the brains of fetuses or newborns. Yet January 15 advising pregnant women to consider postcausation between Zika virus and microcephaly is not yet poning travel to countries with ongoing Zika virus
established. On January 15, 2016, Hawaii reported the transmission—the agency’s first-ever alert for pregnant
first domestic case of microcephaly in a newborn whose women.5 (The Public Health Agency of Canada and the
mother had lived in Brazil. Days later, Florida, Illinois, and Taiwan CDC issued similar advice.) The CDC stopped
Texas reported several infected individuals (some preg- short of a more restrictive “level 3 warning” against
nant) after international travel.
nonessential travel. Travel advisories for the wider
public could include guidance on reducing mosquito
exposure and greater awareness of symptoms. On
National Health System Capacities
The International Health Regulations (IHR) requires ev- returning home, symptomatic individuals should
ery country to develop core health system capacities, but report their travel histories to their physician.

The Zika virus (ZIKV), a flavivirus related to yellow fever, dengue, West Nile, and Japanese encephalitis, originated in the Zika forest in Uganda and was discovered
in a rhesus monkey in 1947. The disease now has “explosive” pandemic potential, with outbreaks in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas.1 Since
Brazil reported Zika virus in May 2015, infections have
occurred in at least 20 countries in the Americas.2 Puerto
Rico reported the first locally transmitted infection in December 2015, but Zika is likely to spread to the United
States. The Aedes species mosquito (an aggressive daytime biter) that transmits Zika virus (as well as dengue,
chikungunya, and yellow fever) occurs worldwide, posing a high risk for global transmission. Modeling anticipates significant international spread by travelers from
Brazil to the rest of the Americas, Europe, and Asia.3
What steps are required now to shore up preparedness
in the Americas and worldwide?
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Clinical Management. An estimated 80% of Zika infections are
asymptomatic, and most of the remainder are self-limited. No specific antiviral treatment is available and care is supportive, with symptoms usually resolving within 7 days.1 Severe GBS cases can require
intensive care, including mechanical ventilation. On January 19, the
CDC issued new guidelines for pregnant women with suspected or
proven Zika virus infection, including an algorithm for offering laboratory testing. (Diagnostic testing is not optimal because antibody
tests could cross-react, giving false-positive results due to other flavivirus infections.) Commercial tests are unavailable, but the CDC and
several state laboratories have testing capability. Pregnant women
with laboratory evidence of Zika virus in serum or amniotic fluid should
consider serial fetal ultrasounds every 3 to 4 weeks.5
Accelerated Research and Development. When Zika infection was seen as usually asymptomatic and self-limited, researchers had little incentive to develop reliable countermeasures. The
emerging data on fetal complications,4 however, have altered this
equation, with research on new vaccines becoming urgent. Similarly, understanding which individuals are at increased risk of GBS
could allow specific antiviral treatment.
A safe and effective Zika virus vaccine is probably 3 to 10 years
away even with accelerated research. The National Institutes of Health
launched a Zika vaccine initiative in late 2015, and Brazil has expedited
vaccine development. Vaccines against yellow fever and Japanese
B encephalitis have been licensed for decades, and Brazil, Mexico, and
the Philippines approved the first dengue vaccine in 2015.
Public Health Emergency Declarations. A national declaration
of a public health emergency can focus political attention, while financing a surge in resources. Public health agencies also have increased authority during public health emergencies. Brazil, for example, proactively declared a public health emergency in November
2015.4 Countries experiencing major Zika virus outbreaks with possible neurological, autoimmune, and congenital malformation associations could invoke heightened emergency powers.

World Health Organization Leadership
The World Health Organization (WHO) Ebola Panel in July 2015
said that urgent warnings “either did not reach senior leaders or
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senior leaders did not recognise their significance.”6 By many
accounts the agency’s failure to act decisively cost thousands of
lives.7 Despite internal reforms, however, WHO is still not taking a
leadership role in the Zika pandemic. On January 18, WHO said it
is “supporting countries to control Zika,” citing the need for surveillance, laboratories, vector control, and clinical care. Yet, the
global dimensions of Zika are quite clear, with fresh urgency as
the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro loom.
Despite the global threat, the WHO director-general has not
convened an IHR Emergency Committee to advise countries on
critical issues such as vector control, health system preparedness,
travel advisories, and avoiding punitive measures. An emergency
committee should be convened immediately to advise the
director-general about the conditions necessary to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). The very
process of convening the committee would catalyze international
attention, funding, and research. While Brazil, PAHO, and the CDC
have acted rapidly, WHO headquarters has thus far not been proactive, given potentially serious ramifications.
Convening an emergency committee does not mean that the
director-general should declare a PHEIC. WHO, for example, convened an emergency committee on 10 occasions to review global
data on the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Yet the
emergency committee has not advised to declare a PHEIC for
MERS but has offered detailed recommendations to guide member states. The director-general has the sole authority under the
IHR to convene an emergency committee, and she is uniquely
empowered to declare a PHEIC subject to the committee’s
advice.
The director-general was widely criticized for waiting
4 months after the first cross-border transmission of Ebola
before declaring a PHEIC.8,9 A key lesson learned from that searing experience was the need for an intermediate-level response
to emerging crises, thus avoiding overreaction while still galvanizing global action. Functionally, the director-general could achieve
a similar result by convening an emergency committee on Zika
virus. The international community cannot afford to wait for
WHO to act.
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